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A Distributed Networked Approach for
Fault Detection of Large-scale Systems
F. Boem, R. M. G. Ferrari, C. Keliris, T. Parisini, and M. M. Polycarpou
Abstract—Networked systems present some key new challenges
in the development of fault diagnosis architectures. This paper
proposes a novel distributed networked fault detection method-
ology for large-scale interconnected systems. The proposed for-
mulation incorporates a synchronization methodology with a
filtering approach in order to reduce the effect of measurement
noise and time delays on the fault detection performance. The
proposed approach allows the monitoring of multi-rate systems,
where asynchronous and delayed measurements are available.
This is achieved through the development of a virtual sensor
scheme with a model-based re-synchronization algorithm and a
delay compensation strategy for distributed fault diagnostic units.
The monitoring architecture exploits an adaptive approximator
with learning capabilities for handling uncertainties in the in-
terconnection dynamics. A consensus-based estimator with time-
varying weights is introduced, for improving fault detectability
in the case of variables shared among more than one subsystem.
Furthermore, time-varying threshold functions are designed to
prevent false-positive alarms. Analytical fault detectability suffi-
cient conditions are derived and extensive simulation results are
presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the distributed fault
detection technique.
I. INTRODUCTION AND STATE OF THE ART
The growing scientific interest for networked and distributed
systems is evident by the large number of works cited in
surveys and books (see, for example, [1], [2]). As complexity
and interconnectedness increase, there is a higher risk of faulty
operation in one or more components/subsystems of the overall
system. In the presence of such faulty scenarios, it is difficult
to detect and isolate the fault, as well as to design methods
for bringing the system back to normal operation. Faults in
a low-level component may have a manageable impact on
system operation; on the other hand, high-level faults can have
significant consequences (for example, human safety, major
economic effects and environmental impact) if not detected
and handled promptly. Therefore, there is a need to develop
fault detection tools in the context of large-scale, distributed
and networked systems, which is the aim of this work.
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Recently there has been a growing interest towards dis-
tributed architectures for the monitoring of large-scale and/or
networked systems (see [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14]. For instance, some recent works on
monitoring and diagnosis of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs)
deal with the detection of attacks against process control
systems [15] and cyber-physical attacks in power networks
[16], [17], [18], [19]. In [20] and [21] distributed schemes to
detect and isolate the attacks on networked control systems
using observers are developed. In [21], applications to power
networks and robotic formations are presented. All these works
about cyber attacks consider linear system models. Another
research topic that has attracted significant interest recently, is
the design of fault detection methods for multi-agent systems
(see as example [22], [23], [24]).
In this work, the distributed fault diagnosis approach pre-
sented in [4], [5] for nonlinear systems is generalized to
address issues emerging when considering networked diagno-
sis systems. In particular, when dealing with communication
networks, one of the main issues is the presence of delays
and packet dropouts, that degrade performance and could
be a source of instability, mis-detection and false alarms.
Delays and packet losses in the communication networks are
dealt with in this paper. While there is an extensive litera-
ture addressing this issue in the control framework (see, for
example, [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], and the references cited
therein), much less literature is available in the case of fault
diagnosis, especially for large-scale systems. In particular,
only the decentralized fault diagnosis problem is considered
(see, for example, [30], [31], [32] and [33], in which fault
detection and isolation schemes for networked systems are
addressed). An exception is [34] and the references cited
therein, dealing with discrete-event systems. Despite these
results, the design of fault diagnosis schemes specifically for
distributed and large–scale systems is still a challenging task
and the issues deriving from networked architectures are not
taken into account. Some works consider the problem of delays
and packet dropouts induced by the networks between the
actuator-sensor and controller-actuator for a networked control
system monitoring, but using a centralized architecture [35],
[36] . Instead, here we consider distributed fault detection
architectures. Moreover, dealing with a networked architecture,
the possibility to have multi-rate systems and asynchronous
measurements is considered. Also in this case, while the
literature addressing this topic in the control field is increasing
(see [37], [38] as example), in the distributed fault diagnosis
these issues still have not been addressed (see [39] for the
centralized case).
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In the following we provide the main aspects of the problem
formulation, the research objectives and the proposed method-
ology.
A. Problem Formulation
In previous works, a distributed approach to Fault Diagnosis
(FD) for large-scale systems has been developed, both in the
continuous-time [4] and in the discrete-time [5] frameworks.
In the following, a brief summary of this methodology is given
for the readers’ convenience and for the sake of completeness.
Details can be found in [4], [5]. The limitations of the existing
monitoring architectures in networked scenarios in terms of
detectability are illustrated and some solutions are presented.
A nonlinear uncertain large-scale system, composed of N
interconnected subsystems, is considered. Its monolithic model
is described by
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)) + η(x(t), u(t)) + φ(x(t), u(t), t), (1)
where x ∈ Rn
x
and u ∈ Rn
u
are the state and the control input
of the system, respectively, f : Rn
x
× Rn
u
7→ Rn
x
models
the nominal dynamics, η : Rn
x
× Rn
u
7→ Rn
x
represents the
modeling uncertainty and φ : Rn
x
×Rn
u
×R 7→ Rn
x
describes
the effects on system dynamics due to any deviation from the
nominal model, which take place for t ≥ T0, where T0 denotes
the unknown fault occurrence time (i.e., φ(x(t), u(t), t) = 0,
for t < T0). The following well-posedness assumption is
needed.
Assumption 1: The state variables x and control variables
u are uniformly bounded before and after the occurrence of a
fault, that is, there exists a compact region R ⊂ Rn
x
× Rn
u
such that (x(t), u(t)) ∈ R, ∀t ≥ 0. 
The state variables are measured by ny sensors, whose
outputs are described by the following equation:
m(t) = Gx(t) + w(t), (2)
where m ∈ Rn
y
is a vector collecting the measurements of
the components of the state vector x, w ∈ Rn
y
denotes the
vector of the measurement noise, and G is a full-rank ny×nx
matrix having one single element equal to 1 for each row,
representing the state component measured by each sensor. We
assume that each state component is measured at least by one
sensor, that is, ny ≥ nx. It is worth noting that – under suitable
additional assumptions (see [40], [6]) – the generalization to
the Input/Output case could be carried out, but this is outside
the scope of this paper.
Assumption 2: For each i-th measurement m(i), with i =
1, . . . , ny being the vector component index, the measurement
uncertainty term w(i) is an unstructured and unknown function
of time, but it is bounded by a known positive time-function
w¯(i)(t) such that
∣∣w(i)(t)∣∣ ≤ w¯(i)(t), i = 1, . . . , ny , t ≥ 0. 
As illustrated in [4], [5], a structural graph can be asso-
ciated with system (1) and a formal (possibly overlapping)
decomposition of the graph can be defined to identify N
subsystems. More specifically, in case that more than one
sensor is available to measure a given state variable x(i), it
might be useful to devise a decomposition with overlapping
subsystems such that the variable x(i) is “shared” among
these subsystems and each sensor measuring x(i) belongs to a
different subsystem (see left side of Fig. 1). In this paper, we
are not dealing with the problem of finding an optimal way of
decomposing the system (see [41]); hence, the decomposition
is assumed to be known a priori. Moreover, we assume that the
existing decomposition implies the allocation of the sensors:
each non-shared variable is measured exactly by one sensor;
shared variables are measured by a number of sensors equal
to the number of sharing subsystems. Each sensor is allocated
to one subsystem.
The I-th subsystem ΣI is modeled as:
ΣI : x˙I(t) = fI(xI(t), uI(t)) + gI(xI(t), zI(t), uI(t))
+ φI(xI(t), zI(t), uI(t), t), (3)
where xI ∈ R
nxI and uI ∈ R
nuI are the local state and control
input vectors, and zI ∈ R
qI is the vector of the interconnection
variables, which are state variables of neighboring subsystems
that influence the I-th subsystem. The function gI : R
nxI ×
R
qI × Rn
u
I 7→ Rn
x
I represents the uncertain interconnection
between subsystems, considering also the local effects of the
modeling uncertainty function η, fI : R
nxI × Rn
u
I 7→ Rn
x
I
models the local nominal healthy behavior. Finally, φI : R
nxI×
R
qI ×Rn
u
I ×R 7→ Rn
x
I describes the local fault effects. In this
paper, we consider both process and actuator faults.
Each sensor is associated with exactly one subsystem (see
Fig. 1). The local sensor S
(i)
I associated with the I-th subsys-
tem provides a measurement m
(i)
I of the i-th component of
the local state vector xI according to the output equation
S
(i)
I : m
(i)
I (t) = x
(i)
I (t) + w
(i)
I (t) , i = 1, . . . , n
xI , (4)
where w
(i)
I denotes the noise affecting the i-th sensor of the I-
th subsystem. It is worth noting that in the local model output
equation (4), there is a correspondence between sensors and
state variables, while this may be not true in the global model
(2) since more than one sensor may measure the same variable
(see again Fig. 1). We assume that the control input is available
without any error or delay.
Similarly to [5], each subsystem of the above decomposition
is monitored by a specific Local Fault Diagnoser (LFD). Each
LFD receives from its local sensors the noisy state measure-
ments forming the vector mI = col(m
(i)
I , i = 1, . . . , n
xI )
(see (4)) and, from the J-th neighboring LFD the noisy
measurements m
(i)
zI , i = 1, . . . , qI of the local state variables
components x
(i)
J that influence the I-th subsystem (i.e., the
variables x
(i)
J belonging to the interconnection vector zI).
Each LFD computes a local state estimate xˆI(t) based on
the local I-th model, by communicating the interconnection
variables (and possibly other information) to neighboring
LFDs. The state estimator takes on a different structure de-
pending on whether the specific i-th component x(i) of the
state is shared among more than one subsystem or not. In the
former case, a deterministic consensus procedure is designed
to take advantage of the availability of more than one sensor
measuring the same variable [4], [5].
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Fig. 1. An example of the proposed multi-layer fault detection architecture.
The system state variables (represented by light blue circles on the left) are
measured by the sensor layer (center). The measurements are represented
by green circles, while the actual sensors by small squares. Each subsystem
(colored dotted boundaries) is described by its local variables and its local
measurements. The sensors communicate their measurements to the LFDs by
means of the first level communication network. The second level communi-
cation network (right) allows the diagnosers to communicate with each other
exchanging information.
The LFD implements a model-based fault detection method:
the local estimation error ǫI(t) = mI(t)− xˆI(t) is compared,
component–by–component, to a time-varying threshold ǫ¯I(t),
suitably computed in order to guarantee the absence of false–
alarms. Moreover, a filtering design [42] is introduced to
reduce the conservativeness of the detection thresholds, which
is here adapted in the current formulation under discrete time.
B. Objectives and Contributions
The existing approaches for distributed fault diagnosis of
nonlinear uncertain large-scale systems that we have previ-
ously described are based on some underlying assumptions
that may restrict their applicability, namely:
1) global synchronization: subsystems, sensors, and LFDs
are assumed to share the same clock and sampling
frequency;
2) perfect information exchange: it is assumed that infor-
mation exchanged between LFDs and communicated
from the system to the LFDs is without any error nor
delay and it is immediately available at any point of the
diagnosis system.
In several realistic contexts, 1) and 2) may not hold, and
as a consequence, i) some faults may become undetectable
due to the fact that LFDs make detection decisions based
on outdated information; ii) delays in information exchange
may cause longer detection times; iii) the lack of accurate and
timely information may cause false-alarms.
In this paper, the distributed fault-diagnosis methodology
presented in [4], [5] is extended to address the above-
mentioned limitations. More specifically:
a) a multi-layer distributed fault diagnosis architecture
is proposed consisting of three layers (the system
layer, the sensor layer and the diagnosis level, see
Fig. 1). This facilitates the investigation of the re-
lationships between the different elements that com-
pose networked systems;
b) a delay compensation strategy is devised to address
delays and packet losses in the communication net-
work between the LFDs (see [43] for some prelimi-
nary results) using Time stamps and a buffer, called
diagnosis buffer(see Fig.2);
c) a model–based re-synchronization algorithm is em-
bedded in the diagnosis procedure. This algorithm is
based on virtual sensors implemented in the LFDs
and on the use of a measurements buffer (see Fig. 2);
d) the filtering-based design recently proposed in [9],
[42] is modified and integrated into the proposed
distributed fault-diagnosis methodology thus enhanc-
ing fault detection robustness and facilitating less
conservative conditions for fault-detectability.
In Fig. 2, an example of a two LFDs architecture is presented
to provide more insight into the structure of the proposed
scheme.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the dis-
tributed fault detection architecture is described: the presence
of a physical system (which is being diagnosed for faults), of
the sensors (which are made of a physical part interacting with
the system to be diagnosed and a computational (cyber) part
able to take process measurements and exchange information
with other sensors of the network to synchronize with each
other) and the local diagnosers (which are computational-
systems as well and able to make model-based estimation
and exchange information with each other). In Section IV, the
distributed fault detection algorithm is presented also detailing
the re-synchronization scheme, the time-varying consensus
mechanism and the delay compensation strategy. In Section V
sufficient conditions for fault detectability are presented that
characterize the class of detectable faults and in Section VI
simulation results illustrating the effectiveness of the fault-
diagnosis scheme are presented. Finally, Section VII reports
some concluding remarks.
II. THE THREE–LAYERS FAULT-DIAGNOSIS
ARCHITECTURE
The proposed distributed fault-detection architecture is
made of three layers: the system layer, the sensor layer and the
diagnosis layer. In Fig. 1, this layout is shown in a pictorial
way. These three layers are briefly described next.
The system layer refers to the large-scale system to be mo-
nitored. It is described by the continuous-time state equation
Eq. (1) and the output equation (2).
The sensor layer consists of the available sensors taking
measurements m
(i)
I (t) in continuous-time (see (4)) and sam-
pling and sending such measurements to the I-th LFD at time-
instants t
(i)
sI that are not necessarily equally-spaced in time.
As we do not assume that the measurements delivered by the
sensors are synchronized with each other, each measurement
is labeled with a Time Stamp (TS) [44] to indicate the time
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Fig. 2. An example of a two LFDs architecture. The internal structure of each LFD is shown, composed of two buffers (the measurements buffer and the
diagnosis buffer) to collect the information received, respectively, by the local sensors and neighboring LFDs, the Virtual Sensor (processing the received
measurements), and the Fault Detection unit, responsible for the monitoring analysis. The communicated information between LFDs is represented.
instant t
(i)
sI at which the measurements are taken by sensor
S
(i)
I in the time-coordinate t.
The communication between the sensors and the LFDs
is achieved through the first level communication network
(see Fig. 1). This network can introduce delays and packet
losses, for instance because of collision between different
sensors trying to communicate at the same time. Therefore,
measurements communicated from the sensors to LFDs may
be received at any time-instant.
The Diagnosis layer consists of the previously introduced
LFDs providing a distributed fault-diagnosis procedure. The
structure of each LFD is shown in Fig. 2. As previously
mentioned, each LFD receives the measurements from specific
sensors with the aim to provide local fault diagnosis decisions.
The LFDs operate in a discrete-time synchronous timeframe
k ∈ Z which turns out to be more convenient for handling any
communications delays, as will be seen in the next sections.
For the sake of simplicity, the sampling time of the discrete
timeframe is assumed to be unitary and the reference time is
common, that is, the origin of the discrete-time axis is the same
as that of the continuous-time axis. Therefore, the operation
of the LFDs is based on the local discrete-time models, which
are the discrete-time version of local models (3):
xI(k + 1) = fI(xI(k), uI(k)) + gI(xI(k), zI(k), uI(k))
+ φI(xI(k), zI(k), uI(k), k) , (5)
where φI describes the local discretized fault effects, occurring
at some discrete-time k0 (that is, φI(xI(k), zI(k), uI(k), k) =
0, k < k0). Each LFD exchanges information with neighboring
LFDs by means of the second level communication network
(see right side of Fig.1 and Fig. 2). As we will see in
the following, the exchanged information consists in the re-
synchronized interconnection variables vJ and a vector that
we denote II,J , collecting some variables needed for fault
detection purposes in the case of shared variables (as will be
explained in Section IV).
In summary, two different and not reliable communication
networks are considered in this paper: the first level commu-
nication network allows each LFD to communicate with its
local sensors and the second level communication network al-
lows the communication between different LFDs for detection
purposes. Both these communication networks may be subject
to delays and packet losses. Given the different nature of the
networks (the first is local, while the second is connecting
different subsystems, which may be geographically apart), in
the next section we provide two different strategies to manage
communication issues: a re-synchronization method for the
first level communication network and a delay compensation
strategy for the second level communication network.
III. RE-SYNCHRONIZATION AT DIAGNOSIS LEVEL
Let us consider a state variable x
(i)
I (t); as mentioned
before, at time t = t
(i)
sI the sensor S
(i)
I takes the mea-
surement m
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ) and sends it to the I-th LFD with a
time-stamp t
(i)
sI . The I-th diagnoser receives the measurement
sent by S
(i)
I at time t
(i)
aI > t
(i)
sI . Since the LFDs run the
distributed fault-diagnosis algorithm with respect to a discrete-
time framework associated with an integer k (see (5)), an on-
line re-synchronization procedure has to be carried out at the
Diagnosis level. Moreover, the possible time-varying delays
and packet losses introduced by the communication networks
between the local sensors and the corresponding LFDs have to
be addressed since they may affect the fault diagnosis decision.
Note that the classical discrete-time FD architecture assumes
that quantities sampled at exactly time k are used to compute
quantities related to time k+1. Unfortunately, the LFDs may
receive measurements associated with time instants different
from k, because of transmission delays and because of the
arbitrary sampling time instants of the sensors. The availability
of the time-stamp t
(i)
sI enables each LFD to implement a set of
local virtual sensors by which the re-synchronization of the
measurements received at the Diagnosis level is implemented.
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We assume that sensors and diagnosers share the same clock
at local level1.
Specifically, each LFD collects the most recent sensors mea-
surements in a buffer and computes a projection mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI ) of
these latest available measurements m
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ), i = 1, . . . , n
x
I ,
to the discrete time instant2 k ≥ t
(i)
aI > t
(i)
sI , by integrating the
local nominal model on the time interval [t
(i)
sI , k].
Remark 1: Let us note that measurements may be related
to and could be received also before time k − 1, without any
assumption on the delay length, thus allowing the presence of
measurements packets losses. Moreover, thanks to the use of
the time stamps and the buffers, ”‘out-of-sequence”’ packets
can be managed. The same measurement could be used by
the virtual sensor more than once to obtain more than one
projections related to different discrete time instants.
The projected measurement mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI ) can be computed
by noticing that, under healthy mode of behavior, the local
nominal model (3) for the state component i at any time
t > t
(i)
sI can be rewritten as:
x
(i)
I (t) = x
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ) +
∫ t
t
(i)
sI
[f
(i)
I (xI(τ), uI(τ))
+ g
(i)
I (xI(τ), zI(τ), uI(τ))]dτ .
Hence, the LFD implements a virtual sensor that generates an
estimate of the measurement at discrete-time k given by
mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI ) = m
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ) +
∫ k
t
(i)
sI
[f
(i)
I (mˆI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), uI(τ))
+ gˆ
(i)
I (mˆI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), mˆzI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), uI(τ))]dτ , (6)
where gˆI characterizes an adaptive approximator designed to
learn the unknown interconnection function gI [45] and mˆzI
are the projections of the measured interconnection variables
mzI . An example enhancing the re-synchronization procedure
for one LFD monitoring a subsystem with three state variables
is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Remark 2: It is worth noting that the discrete-time index
k ∈ Z represents kind of a “virtual Time Stamp” (vTS)
computed by the LFDs after the re-synchronization task and
communicated in the second level communication network
between LFDs. This will be exploited in Section IV.
Remark 3: Although in (6), for analysis purposes, gˆI rep-
resents the output of a continuous-time adaptive approximator,
for implementation reasons, a suitable discrete-time approxi-
mator will be used, designed as explained in Section IV-B.
The above-described projection and re-synchronization pro-
cedure gives rise to an additional source of measurement
uncertainty: the virtual measurement error, which is defined
as
ξ
(i)
I (k) , mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI )− x
(i)
I (k).
1As example, this could be obtained in accordance with the IEEE 1588-
2002 standard (“Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for
Networked Measurement and Control Systems”), where each diagnoser can
be selected as a synchronization master for the sensors that communicate with
it.
2Recall that the sampling time of the diagnosers is supposed to be unitary
for simplicity.
System Layer
Sensor Layer
S
(1)
I
S
(2)
I
S
(3)
I
· · ·
Diagnoser Layer
Synchronization
Fault detection
kk − 1 k + 1
t
(1)
sI
t
(2)
sI
t
(3)
sI
t
(1)
aI
t
(2)
aI
t
(3)
aI
delays
First layer
communication network
Fig. 3. The re-synchronization procedure needed to manage delays and
packet losses in the communication networks between each LFD and its local
sensors. A single LFD is considered whose local model depends on three
variables, which are measured by three different sensors. The clock signals
of each layer involved are shown.
For the sake of analysis, it is worth noting that, due to syn-
chronization and measurement noise, the virtual measurement
error is given by:
ξ
(i)
I (k) = m
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI )− x
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI )
+
∫ k
t
(i)
sI
[∆synchf
(i)
I (τ) + ∆synchg
(i)
I (τ)]dτ
= w
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ) +
∫ k
t
(i)
sI
[∆synchf
(i)
I (τ) + ∆synchg
(i)
I (τ)]dτ ,
(7)
where
∆synchf
(i)
I (τ) , f
(i)
I (mˆI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), uI(τ))
− f
(i)
I (xI(τ), uI(τ)) ,
and
∆synchg
(i)
I (τ) , gˆ
(i)
I (mˆI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), mˆzI(τ |t
(i)
sI ), uI(τ))
− g
(i)
I (xI(τ), zI(τ), uI(τ)) .
For notational convenience, we now collect the projected
measurements mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI ) in a vector, which, in the following,
we denote as yI(k), with k being its vTS:
yI(k) = col
{
mˆ
(i)
I (k|t
(i)
sI ), i = 1, . . . , n
x
I
}
.
Therefore, it is as if the virtual sensor implemented by the
LFDs takes uncertain local measurements yI of the state xI ,
according to
yI(k) = xI(k) + ξI(k),
where ξI is the unknown virtual measurement error (7).
Moreover, in place of the interconnection variables z, only
the vector
vI(k) = zI(k) + ςI(k)
is available for diagnosis, where ςI is composed by the
components of ξJ affecting the relevant components of yJ (as
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before, J refers to a neighboring subsystem). For simplicity,
we assume here that the control signal uI is available to the
diagnoser without any delays or other uncertainty.
The virtual measuring errors ξI and ςI are unstructured and
unknown. For fault detection, it is not necessary to compute
them but, for each i = 1, . . . , nxI and h = 1, . . . , qI , it is
possible to compute a bound for their components using Eq.(7)∣∣∣ξ(i)I (k)∣∣∣ ≤ ξ¯(i)I (k), ∣∣∣ς(h)I (k)∣∣∣ ≤ ς¯(h)I (k),
where
ξ¯
(i)
I (k) = w¯
(i)
I (t
(i)
sI ) +
∫ k
t
(i)
sI
∆¯synchf
(i)
I (τ) + ∆¯synchg
(i)
I (τ)dτ
(8)
is a positive function, w¯
(i)
I is the one defined in Assumption
2,
∆¯synchf
(i)
I (τ)
= max
xI∈RxI
∣∣∣f (i)I (mˆI(τ), uI(τ)) − f (i)I (xI(τ), uI(τ))∣∣∣ ,
remembering that the set RxI is the domain of the state, and
∆¯synchg
(i)
I (τ) can be computed in an analogous way as in
(31) (see Section IV-D). The bound ς¯I is computed with the
same procedure by the neighboring subsystems. In the next
section, the fault-diagnosis procedure is presented.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTED FAULT DETECTION
METHODOLOGY
For fault detection purposes, each LFD communicates with
neighboring LFDs. It is assumed that the inter-LFD commu-
nication is carried over a packet-switched network, which we
call the second level communication network, possibly subject
to packet delays and losses. In order to manage delays in
this network, the data-packets are Time Stamped, with the
virtual Time Stamp, which contains the time instant the virtual
measurements are referred to. In this layer, we assume to have
perfect clock synchronization between the LFDs. In this way,
all the devices of the monitoring architecture can share the
same clock, that is, they know the reference time, and the use
of Time Stamps can be valid.
Furthermore, we propose to provide each LFD with a buffer
to collect the variables sent by neighbors. In the following,
we denote with the superscript “b” the most recent value
of a variable (or of a communicated function value) in the
corresponding buffer of a given LFD; for example, vbI denotes
the most recent value of the measured interconnection vector
vI contained in the buffer of the I-th LFD, while [fI(·)]
b
denotes the most recent value of the function [fI(·)] in the
buffer.
Each LFD computes a nonlinear adaptive estimate x˜I of the
associated monitored subsystem state xI . The local estimator,
called Fault Detection Approximation Estimator (FDAE), is
based on the local discrete-time nominal model (Eq.(5)). In
this paper, differently from [5], to dampen the effect of
the virtual measurement error ξI(k), each measured variable
y
(i)
I = x
(i)
I + ξ
(i)
I is filtered by H(z), where H(z) is a p-th
order, asymptotically stable filter with proper transfer function
H(z) =
z
(
d1z
−1 + d2z
−2 + . . .+ dpz
−p
)
c0 + c1z−1 + . . .+ cpz−p
. (9)
Generally, each measured variable y
(i)
I (k) can be filtered by a
different filter with the exception of shared variables where
for each shared variable the same filters must be used. In
this paper, without loss of generality, we consider H(z) to
be the same for all the output variables, in order to simplify
notation and presentation. The filter H(z) can be written as
H(z) = zHp(z). The filters H(z) and Hp(z) (with impulse
responses h(k) and hp(k) respectively) are asymptotically
stable and hence BIBO stable. Therefore, for bounded virtual
measurement error ξI(k), the filtered virtual measurement
error3 ΞI(k) , H(z) [ξI(k)] is bounded as follows:∣∣∣Ξ(i)I (k)∣∣∣ ≤ Ξ¯(i)I (k) i = 1, . . . , nxI (10)
where Ξ¯
(i)
I are bounding functions that can be computed as
Ξ¯
(i)
I , H¯(z)[ξ¯
(i)
I ], being H¯(z) a filter with impulse response
h¯(k) = |h(k)| and using Eq. (8). Note that we denote with
capital letters the filtered signals.
A. Fault Detection Estimation and Residual Generation
In this subsection we present a method for computing the
local state estimate x˜I for fault detection purposes. In the case
of a non-shared state component i, the local estimation x˜
(i)
I is
given by
x˜
(i)
I (k + 1) = f
(i)
I (yI(k), uI(k))
+ gˆ
(i)
I (yI(k), v
b
I(k), uI(k), ϑˆI(k)), (11)
where gˆI is the output of an adaptive approximator designed in
subsection IV-B to learn the unknown interconnection function
gI , ϑˆI ∈ ΘˆI denotes its adjustable parameters vector and tb is
the virtual time stamp of the most recent information received
vbI in the buffer at time k.
In the case that a state variable x(s) of the global model
(1) is shared among more than one LFD J ∈ Os (being Os
the set of the subsystems sharing x(s)), the estimation can
be computed using a consensus approach (see [5]). We denote
with sJ the local index of the global variable s, that is
4 x(s) =
x
(sJ )
J , ∀J ∈ Os. For the I-th subsystem, the local estimation
x˜
(sI )
I is given by:
x˜
(sI )
I (k + 1) =
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
f
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), uJ (k)
)
+ gˆ
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), v
b
J (k), uJ(k), ϑˆJ (k)
)]b
(12)
with initial condition x˜
(sI )
I (0) = y
(sI)
I (0). Each J-th
LFD communicates to neighboring LFDs sharing variable
3For notational convenience, in the paper we use the shorthand H(z) [ξ(k)]
to denote Z−1 {H(z)Ξ(z)}.
4For example, consider the case shown in Fig. 1: subsystems Σ1 and Σ2
share the state variable x(2) while sub-systems Σ2 and Σ3 share the state
variable x(4) . Thus, x(2) = x
(2)
1 = x
(1)
2 and x
(4) = x
(3)
2 = x
(1)
3 .
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s the local value of the function f
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), uJ(k)
)
+
gˆ
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), v
b
J (k), uJ(k), ϑˆJ (k)
)
(this consists in the first
part of vector II,J , together with some information needed
to compute the thresholds). In this way, it is not necessary
for the local diagnosers to know the other subsystems models.
The terms W
(I,J)
s are the components of a stochastic matrix
Ws (the values of each row add up to 1). In Section IV-E,
the definition of the weight matrix Ws in order to improve
detectability capabilities is given. It is worth noting that the
formulation of (12) includes the case of a non-shared variable
component i (see (11)), since, in this case Oi = {I} and
hence index J is simply equivalent to I , with W
(I,I)
i = 1, by
definition.
We now explain the residual generation: the local estimation
residual error rI(k) is defined as
rI(k) , YI(k)− ŶI(k), (13)
where we obtain the filtered output YI(k) by locally filtering
the measurement output signal yI(k)
YI(k) , H(z) [yI(k)] , (14)
and the output estimates as
ŶI(k) , H(z) [x˜I(k)] . (15)
The residual constitutes the basis of the fault detection scheme.
It can be compared, component by component, to a suitable
adaptive detection threshold r¯I ∈ R
nxI , thus generating a local
fault decision attesting the status of the subsystem: healthy or
faulty. A fault in the overall system is said to be detected when
|r
(i)
I (k)| > r¯
(i)
I (k), for at least one component i in any I-th
LFD.
We now analyze the filtered measurements and estimates:
YI(k) = H(z) [yI(k)] = H(z) [xI(k) + ξI(k)]
= Hp(z) [z [xI(k)]] + ΞI(k). (16)
In the absence of any faults (i.e., φI
(
xI(k), zI(k), uI(k), k
)
=
0), (16) becomes
YI(k) = Hp(z)
[
xI(k + 1) + z
[
xI(0)δ(k)
]]
+ ΞI(k)
=Hp(z)
[
fI
(
xI(k), uI(k)
)
+ gI
(
xI(k), zI(k), uI(k)
)]
+ h(k)xI(0) + ΞI(k), (17)
where δ(k) denotes the discrete-time unit-impulse sequence.
The filtered output estimation model for YI , denoted by ŶI ,
can be analyzed from the estimate provided by (12) as follows:
Ŷ
(sI )
I (k) =
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s Hp(z)
[(
f
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), uJ (k)
)
+ gˆ
(sJ )
J
(
yJ(k), v
b
J (k), uJ(k), ϑˆJ (k)
))b]
+ h(k)y
(sI )
I (0).
(18)
Therefore, the residual (13) is readily computable from (14)
and (15). The residual is analyzed in subsection IV-D to
obtain a suitable adaptive detection threshold. Now, we design
the adaptive approximator gˆI , needed to compute the state
estimate (12) and hence (15).
B. Adaptive Approximator
Reducing the uncertainty on the interconnection function
enables improved detection thresholds which, in turn, results
in better detection capabilities. In this subsection, we consider
the design of a nonlinear adaptive approximator, exploiting the
variables available in the local buffers in each LFD to manage
communication delays (the details of the delay compensation
strategy are given in subsection IV-C). The structure of the
linear-in-the-parameters nonlinear multivariable approximator
is not dealt with in this paper (nonlinear approximation
schemes like neural networks, fuzzy logic networks, wavelet
networks, spline functions, polynomials, etc. can be used).
As shown later on in this subsection, adaptation of the
parameters ϑˆI of the approximator is achieved through the
design of a dynamic state estimator which, in the general case
of shared variables, takes on the form:
xˆ
(sI )
I (k + 1) = λ(xˆ
(sI )
I (k)− y
(sI)
I (k))
+ λ
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
xˆ
b(sJ )
J (k)− xˆ
(sI )
I (k)
]
+
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
f
(sJ )
J (yJ , uJ) + gˆ
(sJ )
J (yJ , v
b
J , uJ , ϑˆJ)
]b
,
(19)
where 0 < λ < 1 is a design parameter. Let us introduce the
estimation error
ǫI(k) , yI(k)− xˆI(k)
and let us analyze ǫI under healthy mode of behavior. By
assumption,
∑
J∈Os
W
(I,J)
s = 1 and the following holds for
shared variables, ∀J ∈ Os (see the model decomposition
procedure outlined in [5]):
f (s)(x, u) + η(s)(x, u, k) = f
(sJ )
J (xJ , uJ) + g
(sJ )
J (xJ , zJ , uJ)
=
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s [f
(sJ )
J (xJ , uJ) + g
(sJ )
J (xJ , zJ , uJ)] .
Moreover, we can write∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s [f
(sJ )
J (xJ , uJ) + g
(sJ )
J (xJ , zJ , uJ)]
=
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s [f
(sJ )
J (xJ , uJ) + g
(sJ )
J (xJ , zJ , uJ)]
b ,
thanks to the fact that only up-to-date information is used in
the consensus mechanism by using the time-varying consensus
matrix (see Subsections IV-C and IV-E): in the case of delays,
only the updated information is used.
Owing to these considerations, we compute the sI -th state
estimation error component, for the general form of (19), as
follows:
ǫ
(sI)
I (k + 1) = y
(sI )
I (k + 1)− xˆ
(sI )
I (k + 1)
=
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
λǫ
(sJ )
J +∆f
(sJ )
J +∆g
(sJ )
J − λξ
(sJ )
J
]b
+ λξ
(sI )
I (k) + ξ
(sI )
I (k + 1) , (20)
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where
∆f
(sJ )
J , f
(sJ )
J (xJ , uJ)− f
(sJ )
J (yJ , uJ)
and
∆g
(sJ )
J , g
(sJ )
J (xJ , zJ , uJ)− gˆ
(sJ )
J (yJ , v
b
J , uJ , ϑˆJ) .
Let us introduce a compact formulation in vectorial form of the
state error equation (20) for the sake of analysis. Specifically,
we define for every s-th state component the extended estima-
tion error vector ǫs,E , which is a column vector collecting the
estimation error vectors of the N sub-systems sharing the s-th
state component: ǫs,E , col(ǫ
(sJ )
J : J ∈ Os). Notice that, if
the s-th state component is not shared, the set is just made of
a single component. The dynamics of ǫs,E can be described
as:
ǫs,E(k + 1) = Ws [λǫs,E +∆fs,E +∆gs,E − λξs,E ]
b
+ λξs,E(k) + ξs,E(k + 1), (21)
where ∆fs,E is a column vector, collecting the values∆f
(sJ )
J ,
for each J ∈ Os; ∆gs,E(k) and ξs,E are defined in an
analogous way as ∆fs,E(k). From this equation, the following
learning law can be derived using Lyapunov stability methods
(see [46]) for every I ∈ 1, . . . , N :
ϑˆI(k + 1) = PΘˆI
[
ϑˆI(k) + γIL
⊤
I [ǫI(k + 1)− λǫI(k)
]
,
(22)
where L⊤I = ∂gˆI/∂ϑˆI is the gradient matrix of the online
approximator with respect to its adjustable parameters and
γI = µI/εI +
∥∥L⊤I ∥∥2F , with PΘˆI being a projection operator
restricting ϑˆI within ΘˆI [47], ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius
norm and εI > 0, 0 < µI < 2 are design constants that
guarantee the stability of the learning law [47].
C. Delay Compensation Strategy
Next, we analyze the properties of the Fault Detection esti-
mator introduced in (IV-A), where the filtered measurements
are used; in particular, we explain how the estimator manages
delays and packet losses in the second level communication
network between diagnosers.
In order to compute (12) and (19), the generic J-th di-
agnoser communicates to the neighboring LFDs the current
values of the terms xˆ
(sJ )
J , f
(sJ )
J + gˆ
(sJ )
J and vI . It is worth
noting that this information exchange between diagnosers can
be affected by time-varying delays and packet losses and hence
a compensation strategy has to be devised5. It is important to
note that a re-synchronization strategy like the one used in
the first level communication networks cannot be used in this
case, since here we consider data exchanged between different
LFDs, and each LFDs, of course, does not know the model of
neighboring subsystems.
5The delay compensation strategy is derived without any assumption on
the delay length, thus eventually dealing with the problem of packet losses
and “out-of-sequence” packets. We assume that the communication network
between diagnosers is designed so to avoid pathological scenarios, such as,
for example, a situation in which the communication delay is always larger
than the sampling time.
As in [43], thanks to the use of the virtual Time Stamps,
the most recent measurements and information are considered.
When a data packet arrives, its virtual Time Stamp vTS is
compared to tb, which is the virtual Time Stamp of the
information already in the buffer. If vTS > tb, then the novel
data packet takes its placed in the buffer and tb ← vTS. At
time tc, with k < tc < k+1, each LFD computes the estimates
for the time instant k + 1 using information referred to time
k. A variable in the buffer is up-to-date if tb = k. Should a
delay or a packet loss occur in the second level communication
network, we proceed as follows:
• If some of the interconnection variables are not up-to-
date, that is tb < k, then the learning of the interconnec-
tion function gI (22) is temporarily paused. Anyway, not
up-to-date interconnection variables are used to compute
the local value of the interconnection function in the
state estimators (12) and (19), but this error is taken into
account in the computation of the detection threshold, as
will be seen in the following subsection.
• The summations in (12) and (19) are carried on only
using up-to-date terms.
In order to allow the implementation of this second strategy,
we adopt a time-varying weighting matrixWs, able to exclude
from the summations in (12) and (19) the terms that are
outdated (see subsection IV-E).
D. Detection Threshold
In order to define an appropriate threshold for the detection
of faults, we now analyze the dynamics of the output estima-
tion error when the system is under healthy mode of behavior.
Since, from (17) we have
Y
(sI )
I (k) =
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
Hp(z)
[
f
(sJ )
J
(
xJ (k), uJ(k)
)
+ g
(sJ )
J
(
xJ (k), zJ(k), uJ(k)
)]]
+ h(k)x
(sI )
I (0) + Ξ
(sI )
I (k),
(23)
we are able to compute the residual defined in (13) by using
(18) and (23):
r
(sI )
I (k) =
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ
(sJ )
J (k)
]b
− ξ
(sI)
I (0)h(k)
+ Ξ
(sI )
I (k) , (24)
where the total uncertainty term χ
(sJ )
J (k) is defined as:
χ
(sJ )
J (k) , Hp(z)
[
∆f
(sJ )
J (k) + ∆g
(sJ )
J (k)
]
. (25)
The interconnection function error ∆gI can be computed as
the sum of four different terms:
∆gI = LI ϑ˜I + νI +∆gˆI +∆g
τ
I . (26)
The first term takes into account the error due to the parame-
ters’ estimation. This error can be characterized by introducing
an optimal weight vector [48] ϑˆ∗I as follows:
ϑˆ∗I , argmin
ϑˆI
sup
xI ,zI ,uI
∥∥∥gI(xI , zI , uI)− gˆI(xI , zI , uI , ϑˆI∥∥∥ ,
(27)
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with ϑˆI , xI , zI , uI taking values in their respective domains,
and by defining the parameter estimation error
ϑ˜I , ϑˆ∗I − ϑˆI .
The second term in (26) is the so-called Minimum Functional
Approximation Error νI , which describes the least possible
approximation error that can be obtained at time k if ϑˆI were
optimally chosen:
νI(k) , gI(xI , zI , uI)− gˆI(xI , zI , uI , ϑˆ
∗
I) .
Then, a term representing the error caused by the use of the
uncertain measurements instead of the actual values of the
state variables is defined:
∆gˆI , gˆI(xI , zI , uI , ϑˆI)− gˆI(yI , vI , uI , ϑˆI) .
Finally, the estimation error due to the use of delayed mea-
surements is taken into account by
∆gτI , gˆI(yI , vI , uI , ϑˆI)− gˆI(yI , v
b
I , uI , ϑˆI)
where vI is the current measured variable and v
b
I is the value
in the buffer, which is “old” in the presence of delays. Clearly,
∆gτI = 0 when up-to-date measurements are used (in this case,
vbI = vI ).
Using (26), the total uncertainty term χ
(sJ )
J (k) in (25) can
be rewritten as
χ
(sJ )
J (k) , Hp(z)
[
∆f
(sJ )
J (k) + L
(sJ )
J ϑ˜J(k) + ν
(sJ )
J (k)
+ ∆gˆ
(sJ )
J (k) + ∆g
τ(sJ )
J (k)
]
, (28)
where L
(sJ )
J indicates the sJ -th line of the matrix LJ . Using
the triangle inequality, (24) satisfies:∣∣∣r(sI )I (k)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ
(sJ )
J (k)
]b∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣ξ(sI)I (0)h(k)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Ξ(sI )I (k)∣∣∣
≤
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[ ∣∣∣χ(sJ )J (k)∣∣∣
]b
+ ξ¯
(sI)
I (0) |h(k)|+ Ξ¯
(sI )
I (k).
(29)
From (28) and using again the triangle inequality, we obtain:∣∣∣χ(sJ )J (k)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Hp(z)[∆f (sJ )J (k) + ∆g(sJ )J (k)]∣∣∣
≤
k∑
n=0
|hp(k − n)|
∣∣∣∆f (sJ )J (n) + L(sJ )J ϑ˜J(n) + ν(sJ )J (n)
+∆gˆ
(sJ )
J (n) + ∆g
τ(sJ)
J (n)
∣∣∣
≤ χ¯
(sJ )
J (k) , H¯p(z)
[
∆¯f
(sJ )
J (k) + ∆¯g
(sJ )
J (k)
]
, (30)
where H¯p(z) is the transfer function with impulse response
h¯p(k) = |hp(k)|,
∆¯f
(sJ )
J (k) , max∣
∣
∣ξ
(sJ )
J
∣
∣
∣≤ξ¯
(sJ )
J
{∣∣∣∆f (sJ )J (k)∣∣∣}
and
∆¯g
(sJ )
I (k) ,
∥∥∥L(sJ )I ∥∥∥κI(ϑˆI) + ν¯(sJ )I (k)
+ max
|ξI |≤ξ¯I(k)
max
|ςI |≤ς¯I(k)
∣∣∣∆gˆ(sJ )I (k)∣∣∣
+ max
vI∈Rv
∣∣∣gˆ(sJ )I (yI , vI , uI , ϑˆI)− gˆ(sJ )I (yI , vbI(tb), uI , ϑˆI)∣∣∣ ,
(31)
with ν¯I denoting a bound to the minimum functional approx-
imation error, the function κI being such that κI(ϑˆI) ≥
∥∥∥ϑ˜I∥∥∥
and RvI ⊂ RqI , where this last term represents a local
domain of the interconnection variable and is communicated
by the neighboring LFDs at k = 0. It is important to remark
that RvI coincides with the domain RxJ for subsystem J
(Assumption 1). Thanks to the way the threshold is designed
from (29), it is straightforward that it guarantees the absence
of false-alarms, since the residual prior to the fault occurrence
always satisfies ∣∣∣r(sI )I (k)∣∣∣ ≤ r¯(sI )I (k) ,
where the detection threshold r¯
(sI )
I is defined as
r¯
(sI )
I (k) ,
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ¯
(sJ )
J (k)
]b
+ ξ¯
(sI )
I (0) |h(k)|
+ Ξ¯
(sI )
I (k). (32)
The threshold term χ¯
(sJ )
J is computed at node J , collected
in the information vector IJ,I and sent to neighboring LFD I .
Remark 4: Notice that, even in the case of a conservative
bound ξ¯
(sI )
I , the second term ξ¯
(sI )
I |h(k)| affects the detection
threshold only during the initial portion of the transient (the
impulse response h(k) of the filter H(z) decays exponen-
tially). Moreover, the term Ξ¯
(sI )
I in (31) takes into account the
uncertainty due to the delays in the communication network
between LFDs. This term is instrumental to ensure the absence
of false alarms caused by these communication delays.
Remark 5: The terms ξ¯I(k) and ς¯I(k) are computed by the
LFDs at each time-step after the re-synchronization task (see
(8)) and are available to compute the fault detection threshold.
Remark 6: Admittedly, the bounds used in (30) and (31)
give rise to conservative thresholds but have the advantage
of guaranteeing the absence of false-positive alarms and of
being easily computable requiring a small amount of data to
be exchanged between the LFDs. In the presence of a-priori
knowledge on the process to be monitored, tighter bound could
be devised (for example, Lipschitz conditions on the local
models could be easily exploited to devise tighter detection
thresholds.
E. Time-varying Consensus Mechanism
In this subsection, the consensus methodology concerning
shared state variables is modified in order to address the con-
servativeness of the detection threshold (32). More specifically,
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the consensus-weighting matrix Ws takes on the following
time-varying form:
W (I,J)s =


1 if J = arg min
J∈Obs
[
χ¯
(sJ )
J (k)
]b
0 otherwise,
(33)
where Obs is the time-varying set of subsystems sharing s at
time k for which the I-th LFD has up-to-date information in
the buffer. In intuitive terms, the time behavior (33) ensures
that a larger weight is assigned to the subsystem characterized
by the lowest threshold (hence, in rough terms, lowest uncer-
tainty in its measurements and in the local model and with the
smallest level of delays and packet losses).
It is important to remark that the consensus protocol uses
only up-to-date information. This means that at each step
each LFD uses only the information received from one LFD
sharing the considered variable and this choice can change
at each step. It is possible that neighboring LFDs sharing the
same variable x(s) use different information for their threshold,
since the threshold term χ¯
(s)
J (k) depends on the reliability of
the communication links, in conjunction with the confidence
that each LFD has in its own measurements and estimates. In
this way, moreover, we can manage time delays and packet
losses: in fact, if the FDAE does not receive some consensus
terms from some neighboring LFDs, it simply considers and
weights only the up-to-date values. It is worth noting that this
approach can be used in any case, with or without delays, and
in Section V we demonstrate that it improves detectability.
In the following simple results, the boundedness of the
estimation error is addressed when the time-varying consensus
matrix (33) is used.
Proposition 4.1: The error dynamics (21), where the con-
sensus matrix is updated according to (33), is BIBO stable.
Proof: Since Ws is a stochastic matrix, its norm is iden-
tically equal to 1. Therefore, since 0 < λ < 1, ‖λWs(k)‖ ≤
γ < 1, with 0 < γ < 1. Let us define:
Us,E(k) = Ws [∆fs,E +∆gs,E − λξs,E ]
b + λξs,E(k)
+ ξs,E(k + 1). (34)
We have:
‖ǫs,E(k + 1)‖ ≤ ‖λW
s(k)ǫs,E(k)‖+ ‖Us,E(k)‖
≤ ‖λW s(k)‖ ‖λW s(k − 1)‖ . . . ‖λW s(0)‖ ‖ǫs,E(0)‖
+
k∑
j=1
‖λW s(k)‖ ‖λW s(k − 1)‖ . . . ‖λW s(j)‖ ‖Us,E(j)‖
≤ γk ‖ǫs,E(0)‖+
k∑
j=1
γk−j ‖Us,E(j)‖
≤
1
1− γ
sup
j≥1
‖Us,E(j)‖
For k → ∞, the unforced system converges to zero
and the series converges to a bounded value (see re-
sults in [49]). Moreover, using results in [50] for un-
forced systems, we can state that a system x(k + 1) =
A(k)x(k), with A(k) ∈ conv(A1, . . . , AN ), is exponen-
tially stable iff ∃ a sufficiently large integer q such that
∥∥Ai1 Ai2 . . . Aiq∥∥ ≤ γ < 1, ∀(i1, . . . , iq) ∈ {1, . . . , N}q. In
our case, therefore, we only need to analyze matrix W s(k).
Since each row of W s(k) has all null elements except one
equal to 1, the product W s(k)W s(k − 1) . . .W s(0) is a
stochastic matrix. Hence, since 0 < λ < 1, we have
‖λt(W s(k)W s(k − 1) . . .W s(0))‖ < 1 and the hypothesis
is satisfied. Finally, since all the uncertain terms are bounded,
then the discrete-time system (21) is BIBO stable.
F. The Local Fault Detection Algorithm
Now, all the elements needed to implement the proposed
fault detection scheme are available. For the sake of clarity,
the implementation of the local fault detection methodology
is sketched in the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Fault detection algorithm for the I-th LFD
Learning = ON
Initialize the estimate xˆI(0) = yI(0)
Initialize the estimate x˜I(0) = yI(0)
Compute the estimate xˆI(1) (Eq. (19))
Compute the estimate x˜I(1) (Eq. (12))
Set k = 1
while A fault is not detected do
Measurements yI(k) are acquired
Compute ǫI(k) = yI(k)− xˆI(k) (for learning)
Compute YI(k) (Eq. (14)), ŶI(k) (Eq. (15))
Compute the residual rI(k) = YI(k)− ŶI(k)
Information from neighbors is acquired
Update consensus weights (Eq. (33))
Compute the threshold r¯I(k) (Eq. (32))
Compare |rI(k)| with r¯I(k)
if |rI(k)| > r¯I(k) then
A fault is detected
Learning = OFF
end if
if Some components i of vI(k) are not received then
Learning = OFF
else
Learning = ON
v
b(i)
I (k) = v
(i)
I (k)
end if
if Learning = ON then
Update ϑˆI(k) (Eq. (22))
else
ϑˆI(k) = ϑˆI(k − 1)
end if
Compute the novel estimate xˆI(k + 1) (Eq. (19))
Compute the novel estimate x˜I(k + 1) (Eq. (12))
k = k + 1
end while
V. DETECTABILITY CONDITIONS
In this section, we address some sufficient conditions for
detectability of faults by the proposed distributed networked
fault detection scheme, thus considering the behavior of the
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fault detection algorithm in the case of a faulty system.
We assume that at an unknown time k0 a fault φ occurs.
Let’s consider the general case of a variable shared among
more than one subsystem. The fault detectability analysis
constitutes a theoretical result that characterizes quantitatively
(and implicitly) the class of faults detectable by the proposed
scheme.
Theorem 5.1 (Fault Detectability): A fault in the I-th sub-
system occurring at time k = k0 is detectable at a certain time
k = kd if the fault function φ
(sI )
I (xI , zI , uI , kd) satisfies the
following inequality for some sI = 1, . . . , n
x
I :∣∣∣∣∣
kd∑
n=k0
hp(k − n)φ
(sI )
I
(
xI , zI , uI , n
)∣∣∣∣∣ > 2r¯(sI )I (kd). (35)
Proof: After fault occurrence, that is for k > k0, equation
(24) becomes:
r
(sI )
I (k) =
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ
(sJ )
J (k)
b
+Hp(z)
[
φ
(sJ )
J
(
xJ , zJ , uJ , k
)]]
− ξ
(sI)
I (0)h(k) + Ξ
(sI )
I (k)
=
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ
(sJ )
J (k)
]b
− ξ
(sI )
I (0)h(k) + Ξ
(sI )
I (k)
+Hp(z)
[
φ
(sI )
I
(
xI , zI , uI , k
)]
.
(36)
Using the triangle inequality, from (36) we can write∣∣∣r(sI )I (k)∣∣∣ ≥ −
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J∈Os
W (I,J)s
[
χ
(sJ )
J (k)
]b∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣ξ(sI)I (0)h(k)∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣Ξ(sI )I (k)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Hp(z)[φ(sI )I (xI , zI , uI , k)]∣∣∣
(37)
and by using a similar procedure as in the derivation of (32),
(37) becomes∣∣∣r(sI )I (k)∣∣∣ ≥ −r¯(sI )I (k) + ∣∣∣Hp(z)[φ(sI )I (xI , zI , uI , k)]∣∣∣ .
(38)
For fault detection at time k = kd, the inequality |r
(sI )
I (kd)| >
r¯
(sI )
I (kd) must hold for some i = 1, . . . , n
x
I , so the final fault
detectability condition is obtained:∣∣∣Hp(z)[φ(sI )I (xI , zI , uI , kd)]∣∣∣ > 2r¯(sI )I (kd).
This can be rewritten in the summation form (35) of the
Theorem.
This theorem provides a sufficient condition for the implicit
characterization of a class of faults that can be detected by the
proposed fault detection scheme. Based on this result, in (35)
it is easy to see that the lower the threshold is, the sooner the
fault will be detected. Therefore the use of filtering along with
the proposed time-varying consensus weighting matrix, able to
choose the lowest threshold components in the case of shared
variables, improves detectability. It is worth noting that this is
true in general, also in the case without delays. Besides, let us
note that the detectability condition represents the minimum
cumulative magnitude of the fault that can be detected under a
specific trajectory of the system. It is possible to study off-line
this condition for representative trajectories of the system.
Remark 7: The use of filtering is of crucial importance in
order to derive tight detection thresholds that guarantee no
false alarms. As it can be seen in the detectability condition
given in (35), the detection of the fault depends on the filtered
fault function φI . As a result, the selection of the filter plays a
crucial role to the proposed scheme. A rigorous investigation
of the filtering impact (according to the poles’ location and
filters’ order) on the detection time under continuous time is
presented in [42].
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results in order
to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
1 2 3 4 5
A A A AA
S 1 S 2u1 u2
x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 x
(3)
1 x
(1)
2 x
(2)
2 x
(3)
2
Fig. 4. Structure of the five-tanks system.
A. The simulation system
We consider a five-tank system [51], monitored by two
LFDs (see Fig. 4). The two LFDs monitor three tanks each
and share the third tank. The local nominal functions f1
and f2 describe the flows through the pipes linking tanks
assigned to the same LFD, while the interconnection terms
g1 and g2 are due to the flow between tanks 3 and 4 and
between tanks 2 and 3, respectively. The monolithic system
(see Fig. 4) is decomposed into two overlapping subsystems.
By using the formalism presented in [5], the decomposition
is D = {Σ1,Σ2}, with index sets I1 = [1 2 3]
⊤ and
I2 = [3 4 5]
⊤, representing the state variables indices
belonging to each subsystem. The third tank is shared, and
therefore the corresponding overlap index set is O3 = {1, 2}.
The tank levels are denoted by x
(i)
I , with I = {1, 2} and
i = {1, 2, 3}, and are limited between 0 and 10 m. Two
pumps are present, feeding the first and the fifth tank with
the following flows: u1 = 1.25+0.25 · sin (0.25 · k) and u2 =
1.75+ 0.4 · cos (0.05 · k). The nominal tank sections are A =
[ 1 1 1 1 1 ] m2, while the interconnecting pipe cross-sections
are nominally equal to Ap = [ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 ] m
2. For
each tank, there are connected drain pipes whose nominal
cross-section are Ad = [ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 ] m
2 . All
the pipes outflow coefficients are unitary. By using balance
equations and Torricelli’s rule, we obtain the state equations
(for details about the dynamical equations of a multi-tank
system see as example [46]). The actual cross-sections used
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are affected by random uncertainties no larger than 7.5%
and 10% of the nominal values, respectively for the tanks
and for the pipes. The tank initial levels and the outflow
coefficients are affected by uncertainties no larger than 15%.
Furthermore the tank levels measurements mI are affected by
measurement noise wI whose components are upper bounded
by w¯1 = [ 0.05 0.05 0.05 ] m and w¯2 = [ 0.05 0.05 0.05 ]
m. The virtual measurement errors are computed on-line
basing on the re-synchronization process. In order to learn the
interconnection functions of each subsystem, which consist
on the flows through pipes crossing a subsystem boundary,
each LFD is provided with adaptive approximators gˆI , im-
plemented by RBF neural networks having 3 and 2 neurons
respectively along the range of each input dimension. Since
the interconnection variables are z1 = x
(2)
2 and z2 = x
(2)
1 ,
the interconnection functions g1(x1, z1, u1) and g2(x2, z2, u2)
should be 5-inputs, 3-outputs functions. On the other hand,
because of the topology of the specific system, both g1 and
g2 have only one non-zero output component and depend
only on (x
(2)
2 , x
(3)
1 ) and (x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2 ) respectively. Therefore,
the adaptive approximators gˆ1 and gˆ2 were realized with two
2-inputs, 1-output radial basis neural networks. The networks
to learn gˆ1 and gˆ2 are implemented with 9 basis functions.
After suitable offline simulations, the parameter domains ΘI
were chosen to be hyperspheres with radii equal to [4 4] · Ts,
with Ts = 0.1 s being the sampling period. The learning
rate auxiliary coefficients for the interconnection adaptive
approximators were set to µ1,0 = 0.005, ε1,0 = 10
−3,
µ2,0 = 0.005, ε2,0 = 10
−3, while the learning filter constants
were all set to λ = 0.85. On the other hand, the detection
filter is designed having transfer function (1−λ)/(1−λz−1).
The different sensor networks, each one measuring a single
variable, have different sampling rates. The measurement sam-
pling periods are [ 10 15 0.5 0.35 0.21 0.45 0.7 ], where the
first two variables are the inputs, while the offsets with respect
to the diagnosers clock are [ 0 0 0.1 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.07 ]. The
measurements signals are shown in Fig. 5, where the real
signals, the sampled measurements and the projected signals
are illustrated.
It is worth noting that the considered case includes a
scenario in which also the input signals are subject to noise
and sampling issues. The communication delays between
diagnosers are random and time-varying: the effects of the
delay are shown in Fig. 6 for the case of two sinusoidal
signals as example. In the first plot, the received time stamp
is illustrated, while the second figure shows the sinusoidal
signals as they are received by the other diagnosers.
B. The simulation scenarios and results
We present three different simulation scenarios. In the first
scenario, the considered fault function represents a leakage (a
circular hole with cross section equal to 0.15 times the nominal
tank section) in the third tank occurring at time k = 200 s.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 7, where the detection
residuals and the time-varying thresholds are represented. It is
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Fig. 5. The measured and the projected signals.
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Fig. 6. The effect of the time-varying communication delays on transmitted
signals and time stamps.
possible to see that both the first and the second local fault
diagnosers are able to detect the fault occurring on the third
tank.
In particular, the fault is detected at time k = 200.5 s by
LFD 1 and at k = 201.2 s by the second diagnoser. We
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Fig. 7. Scenario no.1: detection residuals and thresholds. The saw-tooth like behaviour of the thresholds r¯
(1)
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2 is the effect of the virtual measurement
error bound growing between one actual measurement of the pump inflows and the following one. As they are quite scarce, happening only every 10 and 15
seconds, this effect is noticeable.
compared the obtained results to the case in which all the mea-
surements are synchronized and no communication delays are
present, which is an ideal case. The model and fault parameters
are the same used in the case with multi-rate measurements
and delayed communication. As it is possible to see in Table I,
in this ideal scenario, the first local fault diagnoser can detect
the fault at time k = 200.8 s, while the detection time of the
second LFD is k = 201.0. In Table I, another performance
index is reported, that is theMaximum POst-detection Residual
to Threshold ratio (MPORT). The reason for computing the
MPORT ratio is that it gives a quantitative indication on how
much the thresholds could increase, for instance for coping
with larger uncertainty sources, continuing to detect anyway
the fault. It could be defined, in other words, as an indicator of
the robustness of the threshold with respect to the uncertainties
sources. If it is high, the threshold should be able to detect
the fault even in presence of a larger uncertainty.
In this example, simulation results show that the intro-
duction of the re-synchronization scheme and of the delay
compensation strategy allows to obtain fault detection even
when the measurements are non synchronized and the com-
munication network is not reliable. Moreover, the detection
time is comparable to the ideal case without delays.
In the second scenario, we consider the same system and the
same kind of fault, thus a leakage, but with varying hole radii.
The radii are chosen in order to correspond to hole sections
between 0.15 and 0.5 times the tank nominal section. The
differences with previous scenario are: the sampling time has
been lowered to 0.025 s in order to better appreciate the effect
of the fault magnitude on the detection time; the fault time has
been set equal to Tf = 15.1 s and the fault time evolution is
incipient instead of abrupt, with a time profile described by
β(k−k0) = 1−b
−(k−k0), with b = 250 (see [5] for a definition
of fault time profile). It is possible to see in Fig. 8, how the
detection time and the MPORT ratios change depending on the
different magnitude of the fault. This figure has been generated
by averaging the results of 30 simulations run for each hole
radius, with different random delays, packet losses and model
uncertainties. The two LFDs are not always able to both detect
the fault, as for low values of the hole radius the fault is hidden
by the uncertainties due to measurement asynchronicity, delays
and noise. In particular, the fault magnitude influences the
detectability, with the detection time decreasing for larger
fault magnitudes. Instead, the MPORT ratio shows a clear
and almost linear, in this example, dependence on the fault
magnitude. The results obtained considering this scenario
show thus the importance of the detectability analysis. The
magnitude of the fault is related to the possibility to detect
the fault and to the robustness of the detection.
Finally, in the third scenario, we consider the same 5 tanks
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case Td, LFD 1 Td, LFD 2 MPORT, LFD 1 MPORT, LFD 2
ideal 200.8 201.0 1.798 1.44
real 200.5 201.2 1.346 1.200
TABLE I
DETECTION ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO NO.1.
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Fig. 8. Scenario no.2: detection time and MPORT (Maximum POst-detection Residual to Threshold) ratio vs. leakage holes sections.
system and parameters as in the first scenario, but a different
fault, that is an actuator fault. At time k = 150 s, a fault on
pump number 2 occurs, causing a reduction of the 35% of the
flow. We assume that the fault function has again an incipient
time profile β(k − k0) = 1 − b
−(k−k0), with b = 100. Its
development is thus quite smooth, and only tank 5 is affected
by the fault. We can see the results in Fig. 9 for the component
affected by the fault in LFD 2. For all the other components,
the residuals are lower than the corresponding thresholds. Also
in this scenario, the proposed fault detection architecture is
able to detect the fault even in the worst conditions (delayed
and asynchronous measurements). Due to the smoothness of
the fault time profile, with respect to the leakage case, now
the difference in the detection time between real and ideal
conditions is larger. In the ideal case, we detect the fault at
k = 186.8 s, 36 s after fault occurrence, with MPORT= 1.21,
while in the real case we have detection at 191.7 s, 41 s after
fault time, with MPORT= 1.16.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, a comprehensive architecture for the dis-
tributed fault diagnosis of large-scale nonlinear uncertain sys-
tems in a networked context has been presented. The proposed
approach considers all the parts of the networked system: the
physical environment, the sensor level, the local diagnosers
layer and the communication networks. The general distributed
diagnosis approach presented in [5] is generalized in order
to address some of the issues emerging when designing dis-
tributed networked monitoring architectures. More specifically,
multi-rate variable sampling systems have been considered
and a model-based re-synchronization mechanism has been
proposed to be implemented by each local fault diagnosis unit.
Moreover, a delay compensation strategy is derived to face the
problem of delays and packet dropouts in the communication
networks. Finally, a general class of filters has been embedded
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Fig. 9. Scenario no.3: detection residuals and thresholds.
into the design of the residual and threshold signals in order to
filter measurement noise and derive less conservative detection
thresholds.
As a future work, we will investigate the multiple faults
case and the sensors faults scenario (see for example [52],
[53], [54]).
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